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Structural Racism, Institutional Agency, and Disrespect 
-Andrew J. Pierce 
 
ABSTRACT: In recent work, Joshua Glasgow has offered a definition of racism that is supposed 
to put to rest the debates between cognitive, behavioral, attitudinal, and institutionalist 
definitions. The key to such a definition, he argues, is the idea of disrespect. He claims: “ϕ  is 
racist if and only if ϕ is disrespectful toward members of racialized group R as Rs.” While this 
definition may capture an important commonality among cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal 
accounts of racism, I argue that his attempt to expand the definition to cover institutional or 
“structural” racism is less persuasive. Alternatively, I argue that structural racism must be 
understood in terms of injustice rather than disrespect. This involves giving a fuller account of 
how institutions are related to the beliefs, actions, and intentions of individuals, and thus how 
they can come to embody a certain kind of agency. 
 
 In contemporary race theory and recent social and political philosophy 
generally, the proper understanding of racism has been a matter of significant 
contention. On the one hand, racism has been variously conceived in terms of 
belief, behavior, volition, and psychosexual aversion, just to name some of the 
main candidates. What these conceptions share, despite their differences, is that 
they attempt to explain and understand the racism of individuals. In this sense, 
one might consider them micro-analyses of racism. On the other hand, racism has 
been understood in structural or institutional terms
1
, as a system of power that 
disadvantages some to the benefit of others. These conceptions attempt to explain 
the racism of social structures and institutions rather than individuals. In this 
sense then, one might consider them macro-analyses of racism. However, far from 
the image of complementary perspectives that the language of ‘micro’ and 
‘macro-analyses’ suggests, these two perspectives are often understood as 
competing conceptions, not least because the two approaches lend themselves to 
different conceptual frameworks and methodologies; individualist approaches 
tend to favor moral, ethical, or psychological methods, and structuralist 
approaches tend to favor socio-political and economic methods. Typically then, 
each approach will attempt to show how the other is derivative: institutions are 
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racist insofar as they embody the racist beliefs, intentions, etc. of individuals, or 
individuals are racist insofar as they support and benefit from racist power 
structures, and so on.  
Recently, Joshua Glasgow has made a significant contribution to the 
growing literature attempting to define racism.
2
 He argues for a “monistic” 
definition that can capture the ordinary use of the term in all of its variety, and 
thus put to rest the debates between cognitive, behavioral, affective (or 
“attitudinal” as he has it), and structural approaches to defining racism. The key to 
such a definition, he argues, is the idea of disrespect. He offers, then, the 
following definition: “ϕ  is racist if and only if ϕ is disrespectful toward members 
of racialized group R as Rs.”
3
 The chief advantage of this definition over previous 
attempts is supposedly that ϕ here can refer to any number of the things that we 
might want to call racist: beliefs, attitudes, actions, persons, institutions, policies, 
countries, and so on. I will argue that while Glasgow’s definition may capture an 
important commonality among cognitive, behavioral, and attitudinal accounts of 
racism (all of which he understands as “agent-based” accounts), his attempt to 
expand this definition to cover structural racism is at best incomplete, since it fails 
to explain how institutions can express disrespect. That is, insofar as the ability to 
show respect (and therefore the ability to fail to show respect) requires a certain 
kind of moral agency, the claim that institutions and other non-human entities are 
capable of disrespect implies that they possess this kind of agency, a claim that 
Glasgow fails to demonstrate. In what follows then, I consider two models for 
understanding institutional agency and its relation to individual agency. However, 
even with the aid of these models, it becomes clear that structural racism cannot 
be fully captured by the idea of disrespect. Rather, structural racism must be 
understood as an injustice, one which can obtain even if a particular institution 
does not disrespect those it disadvantages. I thus conclude that a bifurcated or 
“dual perspective” account of racism is preferable to monistic accounts like 
Glasgow’s. 
I. RESPECT AS A CAPABILITY OF PERSONS. 
As Kant has made especially clear, respect is a fundamental feature of moral 
agency, a feature that is distinctively human.
4
 It makes little sense to see an 
earthquake or hurricane as being disrespectful to the individuals it harms. Nor 
does an animal that attacks a human do so out of a lack of respect for human life, 
or for that particular human life. Respect, and so disrespect, is a human capacity, 
part of a uniquely human moral sensibility. It is not my intent, nor Glasgow’s, to 
argue for a particular understanding of what respect or disrespect entails. My only 
claim here is that respect and disrespect, whatever they entail, have their source in 
human moral agency. This claim, however, raises questions about other 
applications of the concept, since disrespect is often predicated of various non-
human as well as human entities: laws and policies, states of affairs, institutions 
and so on. If it is true that the capacity for respect is ultimately located in human 
persons, then laws, institutions, and so on, if they are disrespectful, are so only in 
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a derivative sense, insofar as they come to embody the disrespectful motives, 
attitudes, or beliefs of persons. 
Glasgow calls this a reductionist view, and distinguishes between two 
varieties. “Time-slice” reductionism holds that an institution or other non-human 
entity is disrespectful if and only if, at time T, it is animated by the disrespect of 
individual persons. So, in the case of racial disrespect (which Glasgow argues is 
coextensive with racism) an institution could only be considered racist if it 
currently possessed members, directors, authors, etc. that actively supplied its 
racist motives. Glasgow rightly rejects time-slice reductionism, which implausibly 
suggests that a racist institution would “magically” become nonracist once the last 
racist member dies.
5
 At most, such an institution might, insofar as it was truly non 
(or better, anti-) racist, gain the motivation to eliminate and restructure its racist 
practices, policies, etc., but those practices and policies will not change 
automatically (nor magically) simply because of changes in the beliefs and 
attitudes of the individuals associated with it.  
“Genetic” reductionism, on the other hand, seeks to trace institutional 
disrespect to disrespectful individuals in the institution’s history or origins. So, in 
the case of racial disrespect, an institution is racist if and only if its practices, 
policies, and so on were at one time motivated by racist individuals, and those 
practices and policies remain in force. Glasgow finds this a more plausible 
approach, but still argues that whether or not one can identify in the history of 
racist institutions some individual racist beliefs and attitudes, the present racism 
of those institutions is sometimes separable from those beliefs and attitudes. That 
is, one might grant that an institution has a history of racially disrespectful 
individuals, but still recognize that what makes an institution racist now is that it 
has certain effects in the present, and not that it is contingently traceable to the 
beliefs and actions of past associates. So, Glasgow admits of the possibility at 
least of so-called “pure” cases of institutional racism, as exemplified in his Real 
Estate example, to which I will now turn.  
Real Estate. For centuries, members of R1 systematically targeted the economic 
resources of members of R2 for (unjust) suppression, first through a state-supported 
system of slavery, then through a state-supported system of segregation. Eventually, there 
was a racial rapprochement, where all state-supported means of R2’s economic 
repression (including criminal laws, voting rights, and tax-and-transfer schemes) were 
abolished. However, the rapprochement was not complete in the sense that no reparations 
were made to members of R2, and therefore the postrapprochement era begins with R1s 
uniformly having more wealth than R2s. Two hundred years later, there are no longer any 
attitudes, behaviors, or beliefs, among either R1s or R2s, which we would ordinarily 
identify as racist. However, there also is no change in mortgage policies, which ensures 
that more, and more beneficial, mortgages go to those with better credit ratings, and 
better credit ratings are assigned to those with greater assets. As a direct result of this 
state of affairs, R2s still have fewer good homes, less wealth, and a weaker sense of 
economic security than R1s have.
6
      
 Glasgow claims (and I share the intuition) that we should describe this 
state of affairs as racist, even though no one involved with the relevant institutions 
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holds any racist attitudes or beliefs. And even though one could trace the 
offending practices in this example to the racist attitudes and beliefs of past R1s, 
Glasgow insists that those past attitudes do not explain why the practice is racist 
in the present. He thus takes this to be a case of pure institutional racism.  
The problem here is that once Glasgow denies that Real Estate’s racism 
can be traced to the racially disrespectful attitudes, beliefs, and actions of past 
individuals, the link to individual agency is severed, and one can no longer 
explain the source of the disrespect. Put another way, “pure” cases of institutional 
racism seem to require something like “pure” institutional agency, an agency that 
is not traceable to the agency of individual moral agents, past or present. At worst 
this is an absurd consequence. At best it stands in need of further explanation. In 
the next section I introduce two ways of understanding this relationship between 
individual and institutional agency, one based in the social contract tradition, and 
the other drawing from Habermas’ sociology of system and lifeworld. This will 
help us to determine if the idea of “pure” institutional racism can be salvaged. 
II.        TWO MODELS OF THE RELATION BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL 
AND INSTITUTIONAL AGENCY 
Perhaps the most familiar way of accounting for institutional agency is found in 
the theory of the social contract. Social contract theory, as found in Hobbes and 
Locke especially, provides a model for how the rational autonomy of individuals 
is “transferred” to a sovereign institutional body (even if this is just the “body” of 
one individual, the sovereign, it can still be thought of as institutional rather than 
individual, as Hobbes makes especially clear), through consent. On this model, 
the ability of a sovereign body to act as an agent, for example, in making laws, or 
determining punishments for transgressing laws, is derived from the “natural” 
powers of individuals, including the power of autonomy or self-legislation (the 
ultimate source of legislative powers) and the power to punish offenses to oneself 
(the ultimate source of executive power). Despite significant differences in the 
way Hobbes and Locke explicate these powers (concerning, for example, whether 
they ought to be separated into several institutions or combined in one absolute 
power, whether individuals can or should relinquish the right to ongoing input 
into these institutions, and so on), the idea that the power of political institutions 
comes from the consent of the individuals that they govern represents the 
revolutionary core of social contract theory. Though it may not be typically 
understood in such terms then, social contract theory can be seen as providing an 
account of how individual agency can be “institutionalized” in a certain way. That 
is, when a group of individuals agree to establish an institution, defined by certain 
social roles and allocated certain powers, and when these individuals further agree 
to recognize the acts of such an institution as legitimate and binding (at least 
amongst themselves), it becomes possible to understand such an institution as 
possessing an independent, institutional agency. Call this the contract model of 
institutional agency. 
 This model invokes the idea of a contract for the purposes of explanation 
rather than justification. These two functions of contract theory are often 
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conflated, but nonetheless distinct. It is conceivable, for example, that some group 
of persons could contractually establish an institution intentionally designed to 
dominate, oppress, or exploit another group of persons. The question of whether 
such an institution is morally legitimate is distinct from the question of whether 
the contract model usefully illuminates the process that gives rise to it. Indeed, 
regarding institutional racism, I presume, as will most readers, that the institutions 
that are appropriately labeled as such are illegitimate. This has little to do with 
whether the contract model provides a plausible explanation of why such 
institutions are racist, or how they come to embody individual morally relevant 
features like disrespect. 
 Charles Mills’ seminal work The Racial Contract provides a clear 
example of how the contract model can be used to theorize systematic, 
institutionalized racial oppression. Mills argues that racial oppression can be 
usefully understood as arising from the conscious, explicit historical agreements 
of whites, agreements to colonize, enslave, and expropriate the resources of 
nonwhites throughout the world.
7
 Thus, the theory of the Racial Contract purports 
to be descriptive rather than normative, and emphasizes the role of human agency 
in the construction of white supremacist social and political institutions. Far from 
conflating the explanatory and legitimating functions of contract theory, Mills’ 
description of the Racial Contract allows us to see why the institutions it gives 
rise to are illegitimate: because they arise from agreements that dramatically 
affect the lives of many millions of nonwhite people without their consent. Mills’ 
view can thus be understood as a version of genetic reductionism. His claim is not 
that currently living whites have secretly agreed to construct and promote racist 
institutions (though he does note that all whites are “beneficiaries” of white 
supremacy, whether they support it or not), but that such institutions derive their 
agency from past (and some present) “signatories” to the contract, those who do 
actively construct and promote them.
8
 
 Mills’ theory of the Racial Contract illustrates one of the advantages of the 
contract model of institutional agency. It reminds us that the faceless, anonymous 
institutions of modern life have human roots, and that their shortcomings and 
injustices are thus human shortcomings and injustices. It reminds us that “white 
supremacy… is a political artifact, a human construct, an artificial human 
contrivance involving elements of choice, deliberation and purpose, brought into 
existence by humans and maintained by (some) humans' acquiescence and 
support, in short a conventionally-generated human creation.”
9
 This implies that 
such injustices are not inevitable, and that it is possible to hold persons 
responsible for them. In the same way, the traditional social contract emphasized 
that society itself was an artificial human construction rather than a “natural” 
entity, as Aristotle and other Ancients presumed. As a result, social hierarchies 
previously thought of as inevitable now appeared as malleable in the interests of 
justice and human emancipation. Thus the contract model should at least make 
one wary of the idea of “pure” institutional agency, insofar as thinking about 
institutions in this way might conceal the human agency that gives rise to them, 
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and thus fail to recognize the moral responsibilities and failures of those human 
agents.  
 However, it is also true that in our complex modern world, institutions do 
at least seem to take on a “life of their own,” an independent causal efficacy that 
might be understood in terms of agency. The “invisible hand” of the market 
economy might be thought of as such an independent agent, the enduring 
bureaucracy of the State, or even the “culture” of various particular institutions, to 
which individuals may feel pressured to conform. Whether or not such 
phenomena are actually traceable to the actions of particular individuals (that is, 
whether or not genetic reductionism is correct), they often appear as agents in 
their own right, which is sufficient to have real effects on the individuals who thus 
perceive them, effects which may or may not have been intended by the 
individual directors and progenitors of the institution.
10
 Thus one might think of 
the relation of individuals and institutions as reciprocal. True, institutions do not 
arise ex nihilo, but from individuals acting in concert. Contract theory usefully 
illustrates this process. However, once established, institutions can in turn shape 
and influence individuals in unintended ways. For example, the market economy 
in advanced capitalist societies not only responds to consumer demands, but plays 
a significant role in shaping those demands. The contract model neglects this 
important dimension of institutional agency, a dimension that is crucial for 
understanding how institutional racism can continue unaffected by changes in 
individual beliefs and attitudes. The tradition of structuralism on the other hand, 
rooted in Sausserian linguistics, and applied to social theory by Levi-Strauss, 
Althusser, Foucault, and others, goes too far in the other direction, seeing 
individuals as being completely determined by the structures in which they are 
conceived merely as “elements,” “subject-positions,” “iterations,” and so on. 
What is needed is a model that captures both dimensions (or perhaps, directions) 
of causal effect, and therefore illuminates the complex relationship between 
individuals and institutions. 
 I submit that Habermas’ sociological framework of system and lifeworld 
can provide a more accurate and sophisticated model of institutional agency than 
the contract model. That is, it captures both that institutions are born from the 
collective action of individuals, and that institutions can shape individuals and 
individual actions, sometimes in ways that affect their very ability to intentionally 
direct those institutions. While I am not aware of anyone who has explicitly done 
so, comparing Habermas’ theory with contract theory in this way should not be 
particularly surprising.
11
 Habermas’ career-long task has been to provide a 
defense of the Enlightenment project of founding moral and political authority on 
a form of rationality that would allow for universal consent, essentially the same 
project that gave rise to the original social contract theories. The main differences 
lie in the way that Habermas conceives of rationality (as fundamentally 
intersubjective, rather than as a capacity of individual subjects), and in his attempt 
to take seriously the tradition (from Marx, through Weber, to Habermas’ 
predecessors in the Frankfurt School of critical theory) that shows how rationality 
has been co-opted in the service of oppression and domination. The former aspect 
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(the reconstruction of rationality on intersubjective grounds) culminates in 
Habermas’ two-volume Theory of Communicative Action, which demonstrates 
that communication oriented toward mutual understanding can provide the basis 
for collective guidance of complex social systems.
12
 To understand society in this 
way – as a cooperative, intentionally directed endeavor – is to look at it from the 
perspective of the lifeworld. The latter aspect (sensitivity to the potential for 
domination inherent in social processes of “rationalization”) leads Habermas, 
drawing from the systems theory of Talcott Parsons and Niklas Luhmann, to 
theorize the ways in which social systems can develop their own independent 
rules and imperatives, which can interfere with and undermine their collective, 
intentional direction. Habermas names this latter phenomenon the “colonization 
of the lifeworld.” In order to sufficiently compare this model to the more familiar 
contract model, it is necessary to say a bit more about the concepts of system and 
lifeworld, and the role that they play in Habermas’ theory of communicative 
action.    
As just noted, the analysis of society from the perspective of the lifeworld 
emphasizes the ways in which society is guided by the collective volition of its 
members. In Habermas’ own words, it is “the intuitively present…familiar and 
transparent, and at the same time vast and incalculable web of presuppositions 
that have to be satisfied if an utterance is to be at all meaningful.”
13
 That is, the 
lifeworld is the shared, linguistically mediated “world” that forms the necessary 
background against which communication can be successful. The lifeworld thus 
marks a kind of implicit agreement, a rather banal one, perhaps, but also a very 
important one, since Habermas takes this kind of linguistic agreement to 
demonstrate the possibility of a normative perspective in general, one that can be 
put to use in moral, political, and legal discourse. However, Habermas warns 
against a “hermeneutic idealism” that understands society as a whole in these 
intentionalist terms. The lifeworld perspective, he thinks, must be supplemented 
by another perspective that theorizes the limits of communicative action, as well 
as its impediments. The systems perspective then, takes into account precisely 
those tendencies that Weber and early critical theorists saw as all-encompassing. 
Modern social systems like the state and the economy do take on their own kind 
of instrumental rationality, understood as a means of effectively achieving its 
ends, which is separate in principle from the communicative rationality of 
collective action. In the first place, this is simply because increasing social 
complexity makes direct, intentional control of complex social systems 
impossible. Perhaps in small, primitive societies, social organization could be 
understood solely in intentional terms. But in modern society, we cannot 
exchange goods and services by way of coming to mutual agreement about the 
value of goods in each case. So a market economy arises, along with the medium 
of money (or, if one prefers, the “commodity form”), to “unburden” the lifeworld 
of this demand. Similarly, in large, complex societies, we cannot feasibly come to 
agreement about every law or policy that presents itself in the political arena. So a 
representative system arises to carry out this task, a system which also has its own 
unique form (the form of positive law).   
8 
 
Habermas does not find these systems inherently problematic. They arise 
to meet the needs of lifeworlds overburdened by social complexity. However, the 
instrumental rationality they employ as means to human ends does suffer from the 
dangerous tendencies toward domination that early critical theorists identified. An 
economic system based on the commodity form, for example, tends by its very 
nature to expand beyond its proper scope, since capitalism cannot reproduce itself 
except through constant growth. This expansion is both horizontal, seeking out 
new markets for goods and services, and vertical, commodifying areas of human 
life previously considered sacred, or at least not subject to principles of exchange. 
The relinquishing of political authority to professional politicians also tends to 
expand beyond its necessity, insofar as it begins to view all political decisions as 
expert matters, creating a “democratic deficit” that undermines its own 
legitimacy. These are examples of the “colonization of the lifeworld” by systemic 
imperatives. With the image of colonization, Habermas means to acknowledge the 
dangers of Weberian rationalization that previous critical theorists recognized 
while still maintaining a theoretical space for critical reflection and transformation 
of these very systems.  
I think that anyone who is sufficiently familiar with it would agree that 
Habermas’ theory of communicative action provides a more sophisticated and 
empirically accurate picture of how individuals come to linguistically mediated 
agreements (including contractual agreements), and how such agreements come to 
have normative force, than contract theory. However, it is not my purpose to 
argue this point here. The more important point of comparison involves the 
systemic dimension of his analysis, and the idea of systemic “colonizations” of 
the lifeworld, for which there is no correlate in the contract model. If the idea of 
“pure” institutional racism is defensible, it might find a qualified defense here, in 
an explanation of how systems that have their origins in collective, intentional 
action become “uncoupled” from that kind of intentional direction, and instead 
take on an independent, self-sustaining character.
14
 That is, thinking about 
institutional racism as a “colonization of the lifeworld” captures the initial 
intentionality of racial oppression as well as the semi-autonomous character it 
takes on once reified into systems. Once collective, willful racial oppression is 
solidified in systems of law, “objective” economic imperatives, and so on, 
oppressor groups are “unburdened” of the physical and psychological 
requirements of oppressing. Whites, for example, can now enjoy all the privileges 
of whiteness while simultaneously professing a cheery attitude of liberal 
tolerance. They can enjoy higher wealth and wages without the moral turpitude 
associated with expropriation. And they can hold the highest offices and positions 
while resting assured that everyone else had “equal opportunity” to hold them as 
well. In this way, the white psyche is insulated from the potentially damaging 
effects of oppressing, and is thereby enabled to construct a positive individual 
identity, supposedly separate from its membership in a particular group (the white 
race).
15
 This psychological unburdening mirrors the physical unburdening of an 
earlier system of slavery that literally unburdened white slave-owners of the labor 
necessary for the production of material wealth.  
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Putting Habermas’ system and lifeworld framework to use for 
understanding institutional racism in this way requires going beyond his 
generalized account of the benefits and burdens of various systems, however. It 
requires recognizing that the “vast and incalculable web of presuppositions” 
underlying social interaction in countries like the United States includes various 
racial presuppositions; in other words, it requires recognizing that the lifeworlds 
of the denizens of such countries are racialized lifeworlds.
16
 Accordingly, the 
benefits (unburdening functions) and burdens (colonizing functions) are not 
equally distributed across a generalized lifeworld, but unequally distributed along 
racial lines, in ways that are fundamentally unjust. This unjust distribution of 
benefits and burdens is critical for understanding contemporary institutional 
racism. So, while the system and lifeworld model of institutional agency may 
provide a better understand of how institutions can come to embody moral 
attitudes like disrespect, and may even provide a way of reconciling genetic 
reductionism with cases of “pure” institutional racism, it also points to a very 
different way of understanding institutional racism: as a matter of injustice rather 
than disrespect. I will now turn to this alternative conception, and its advantages 
over Glasgow’s disrespect analysis. 
III. RACISM AS INJUSTICE. 
 
In order to demonstrate the inadequacy of Glasgow’s disrespect analysis for 
understanding institutional racism, let me provide an alternative case of “pure” 
institutional racism to consider alongside his Real Estate example. Call this 




The Toxic Doughnut Hole: On the outskirts of a major U.S. city, a predominately black 
community is literally surrounded by landfills, sewage plants, chemical refineries, and 
toxic dumps. The air, water, and soil are polluted at levels three to four times what is 
considered safe. Rates of cancer, asthma, and emphysema, among other illnesses, are 
more than double that of the general population. Furthermore, the industries surrounding 
this community are inspected and cited less frequently by regulatory bodies than 
comparable industries in white communities, and when they are cited for regulatory 
infractions, the fines levied are consistently less than those imposed for comparable 
violations in white communities. Let us suppose that the directors of these industries lack 
any beliefs, attitudes, or behaviors that we would normally consider racist. The 
motivation for locating their facilities here is purely economic: lower real estate prices, 
lower taxes, favorable zoning regulations, and etc. Let us suppose further that in locating 
their facilities here, these industries actually sought out the input and consent of the 
neighboring community, thus extending them due respect. And let us suppose that, as an 
economically depressed community desperate for jobs and tax revenue, the community 
consented to the construction and location of the facilities. 
 
Excepting the bit about seeking and receiving the consent of the affected 
communities, situations similar to this have frequently been described as cases of 
environmental racism, and I think the description is apt. If it is, the fact that the 
disadvantage is not caused by the racist beliefs or actions of individuals makes it a 
case of institutional racism. The question is: if such situations can be described as 
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racist, is it because they are disrespectful, as Glasgow would insist? If so, then the 
introduction of consent, as evidence of respect, should be sufficient to make the 
situation no longer racist. I think that it is not.  
 
First, let us set aside all of the typical difficulties with consent that this 
example raises. Let us presume that all community members, present and future, 
consent to the construction of the facilities, that their consent was given with full 
knowledge, and so on. So long as a systematic racial disadvantage remains, I 
contend that extending respect to the affected parties does not preclude describing 
the situation as racist. Rather, what makes this example (as well as Glasgow’s 
Real Estate example) racist is that some individuals benefit undeservedly on the 
basis of race, and others suffer undeservedly on the basis of race. Insofar as 
systematic undeserved advantage and systematic undeserved suffering are unjust, 
racism of this sort, institutional racism, is better understood as a distributive 
injustice, or, more precisely, a systematically related set of distributive injustices, 
producing systematic advantage or disadvantage depending on one’s race. To say 
that the distributive injustices are systematically related means that they are, if not 
interdependent, at least mutually supporting in ways that dispose those who suffer 
from one to suffer from others as well. For example, the fact that African-
Americans have a rate of poverty nearly twice that of whites predisposes them to 
suffer from other kinds of harm: poorer schools (given that educational funding is 
frequently linked to property taxes), greater likelihood of being a victim of violent 
crime and greater likelihood of imprisonment (presuming some link between 
poverty and increased criminal activity), reduced access to commercial services 
(since banks, grocery stores, and so on prefer to locate in neighborhoods with 
greater disposable income), and etc.
18
 In turn, poor schools, high crime, etc., 
exacerbate poverty for current and future generations, perpetuating structural 
disadvantage. This is oppression in its precise meaning, which Marilyn Frye 
defines as including “situations in which options are reduced to a very few and all 
of them expose one to penalty, censure or deprivation.”
19
 She illuminates this 
experience through the metaphor of a birdcage. If one focuses on any single wire, 
one cannot grasp why that wire impedes the bird’s motion. It is only when one 
understands the systematic relation of the wires to one another that one can see 
why the bird is immobilized. Institutional racism is a kind of oppression, and the 
image of the birdcage illuminates its systematic nature.  
 
The idea of disrespect fails to capture this kind of systematic disadvantage. 
In the case of the Toxic Doughnut Hole, it is understandable that a community in 
desperate need of jobs might consent to the building of job-producing industrial 
facilities even if those industries had significant costs in terms of health. Yet even 
when consent is sought and received, and when the affected parties are treated 
respectfully, the situation is still unjust. The injustice lies in the fact that certain 
communities are forced to make such choices in the first place. One needs to ask 
(if not in the hypothetical example, at least in its real-life correlates) why certain 
minority communities are forced to choose between jobs and health, between 
living in safe neighborhoods and receiving fair treatment from police, between 
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quality education and personal safety, and so on. If minority communities are 
consistently faced with such dilemmas more frequently than white communities, 
one can describe the situation (and the society at large, if such situations are sufficiently 
widespread) as racist. Moreover, the health-related disadvantages in this example 
are systematically related to other disadvantages. As mentioned, the companies’ 
reasons for locating their facilities in this neighborhood are, we imagine, purely 
economic. But we must ask why such incentives exist. Why are property taxes so 
low? Presumably, the high crime, high unemployment, low income, and other 
typical characteristics of impoverished communities play a role in creating this 
economic incentive. Why are zoning regulations so lax? Perhaps because 
impoverished communities are also frequently politically disenfranchised, and so 
raise fewer effective complaints than better-situated communities. When one 
begins to ask these questions, what emerges is a picture of some populations 
systematically disadvantaged by various interrelated barriers, and other 
populations systematically advantaged by those same barriers. That toxic waste, 
landfills, and etc. are disproportionately located in poor, minority communities 
means that they are disproportionately absent from well-off white communities, 
who also probably benefit more from the products and processes that produce 
such waste. That fewer mortgages go to “R2s” in Glasgow’s Real Estate example, 
means that more are available to “R1s.” Put simply, when dealing with finite 
resources, a disadvantage for one group creates an advantage for everyone else.
20
 
This principle is straightforward, but frequently those who are willing to admit 
that racial minorities face significant disadvantages resist making the logical step 
of acknowledging that non-minorities thus enjoy significant advantages. That 
these advantages and disadvantages track along racial lines means that they are 
not based on merit, just transfer, or any other plausible criteria for distributive 
justice. In short, they are undeserved. This is why they represent an injustice.  
 
Institutional racism of this kind does not depend upon the ongoing 
intentional malice of racist agents, though it does perhaps depend on the willful, 
self-serving ignorance of advantaged populations. This is why institutional racism 
can occur in the absence of individual racism. Frequently however, those who 
attempt to give a general account of racism take immorality to be an essential 
feature of racism, and so take it that any definition of racism must account for this 
feature. One might wonder whether an institutional account of racism can do this. 
Admittedly, insofar as an institutional account of racism, sees (this kind of) 
racism as a property of systems, institutions, and structures that distribute benefits 
and burdens in unjust ways, rather than as a property of persons, or their beliefs, 
attitudes, actions, etc., it complicates the attribution of moral responsibility. 
However, the complexity here mirrors a complex reality, one which admits of 
various degrees of moral responsibility. For example, one could argue that it is 
immoral to benefit from unjust inequalities, or from the suffering or oppression of 
others, while recognizing that doing so is less morally egregious than actively 
causing such suffering. It is not necessary, and probably not helpful, to label those 
benefitting from unjust systems of institutional racism racists. But it is possible to 
recognize a moral responsibility for unjust advantages.   
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  Focusing on injustice allows one to make important distinctions among 
forms of racism. Glasgow notes rather dismissively in the beginning of his article 
that “while there is some excitement over the proposition that only the most 
powerful members of society can be racist within it, a consensus seems to be 
emerging that just about anyone can be racist.”
21
 And while he doesn’t cite any 
evidence of this emerging consensus, he does briefly return to the point at the end, 
arguing that, though he is inclined to reject the view that racism requires power, 
his disrespect analysis is neutral with regard to this question, holding that “if only 
the most powerful can generate racial disrespect (which I doubt), then only the 
most powerful can be racist.”
22
 Perhaps there is an emerging consensus that “just 
about anyone can be racist,” if not in the academic literature, then at least in 
popular wisdom. I do not doubt that racial minorities can have beliefs and 
attitudes about whites that could be described as racist, nor that such beliefs and 
attitudes can have real, serious effects, for example when they motivate hate 
crimes against individual whites. There are reasons to hesitate about thinking that 
all forms of racism are equally immoral, but let us set them aside here and 
presume that they are. There is still an important difference between white and 
anti-white racism: anti-white racism typically lacks the systemic uptake necessary 
to become institutionalized, while white racism today is paradigmatically 
institutional.
23
 Put another way, even if one assumes that all (individual, agent-
based) racism is immoral, it does not follow that all racism is unjust. If one draws 
the typical modern distinction between morality and justice in which morality 
governs the character/actions/intentions of individuals, while justice governs 
social institutions (and societies on the whole), it follows that only those forms of 
racism that have become institutionalized or systemic should be evaluated in 
terms of justice. Anti-white racism may be immoral, but white racism is 
frequently both immoral and unjust, insofar as it encourages and is encouraged by 
structural imperatives that systematically disadvantage non-white populations. 
This is a critical insight, for reasons that I will make clearer in the next section, 
and Glasgow’s disrespect analysis fails to capture it.       
   
  Finally, a dual perspective account like the one I am offering is non-
reductionist. Some accounts of institutional racism may insist that, insofar as 
individual beliefs, attitudes, and actions are shaped by social institutions, all 
racism can ultimately be traced to institutional racism. Such a view actually 
represents a third kind of reductionism, in addition to “time-slice” and “genetic” 
reductionism. Just as one might understand institutional racism reductively, as 
derivative of individual “agent-based” racism, one might conversely understand 
individual racism reductively, as derivative of institutional racism, and be no less 
a monist for it. Glasgow hints at such views when he mentions, in a footnote, that 
even in the absence of individual agent-based racism, “institutional racism can 
foster agent-based racism” anew, insofar as the inequalities produced by 
institutional racism may encourage racist views about natural differences in 
ability and so on.
24
 However, I think such an institutional reductionism is 
ultimately mistaken as well, in part because it would be vulnerable to the criticism 
about lacking an account of moral responsibilities for racism. My account 
13 
 
however, does not insist that all racism is institutional, only that some is. It thus 
retains a place for agent-based accounts of racism that focus on individual moral 
responsibility for beliefs, actions, and etc. Still, I do think that the most persistent 
and egregious kinds of racism that countries like the United States face today are 





IV. “ORDINARY USAGE” AND OTHER SEMANTIC ISSUES. 
Glasgow’s attempt to define racism in terms of disrespect takes as its primary 
adequacy criterion that a proper definition should “accommodate ordinary 
usage.”
26
 Glasgow does not take this to preclude that the term to be defined is 
“often used in contested ways,” but he nonetheless insists that “other things equal, 
the more that an analysis can accommodate ordinary usage, the better.”
27
 Other 
things, of course, are not equal. Rather, the deeply divisive racial inequalities in 
places like the United States often produce significantly different estimations of 
what counts as racism, and how prevalent it is. A recent poll, for example, shows 
that black Americans are more than twice as likely as white Americans to say that 
racism is a “very serious” problem.
28
 While this may be a result of differential 
access to the kinds of experiences that would lead one to draw this conclusion, it 
may also be the result of differences in the “ordinary” conceptions of racism held 
by white and black Americans. Moreover, one can think of cases where a 
particular action, belief, policy, etc. is considered by some to be racist, and the 
precise opposite of that action, belief, policy etc., is considered racist by others. 
Affirmative action, for example, is often characterized as racist by its detractors, 
while its supporters sometimes label such opposition itself racist. More generally, 
social policies that take race into consideration in any way are thought by some to 
be racist, whereas others accuse such a naïve “colorblind” approach of 
perpetuating racism. One may take instances such as these as prima facie 
evidence that there are different accounts of racism at work in the opposing 
judgments. If so, appealing to ordinary usage will not be helpful.  
Worse yet, deferring to the ordinary usage of a morally and politically 
loaded term like racism can actually discourage using the term in non-typical 
ways that nonetheless might illuminate important features of social reality, like 
the existence of unjust, systematic racial disadvantage. In fact, I think this is 
precisely the problem with standard accounts of racism, which typically do reflect 
the way the term is ordinarily used, a use that is deeply connected to the 
individual, agent-based view, and therefore makes it difficult to recognize forms 
of racism that don’t readily correspond to individual moral failings. In describing 
institutions which systematically disadvantage some racial groups as “racist,” I 
am admittedly parting with some forms of ordinary usage, but this is because 
those forms are an impediment to recognizing some of the most harmful instances 
of racial disadvantage. So, if abandoning ordinary usage must count as a cost of 
my view, as Glasgow insists, then I take it that this cost is outweighed by the 
benefit of being able to address the serious and egregious injustice of institutional 
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racism, which his own account fails to do, for the reasons outlined in the previous 
pages.  
 
In other words, ordinary usage cannot be taken as a neutral adequacy 
criterion for defining socio-cultural terms like racism, because the meaning of 
such terms depends upon changing social practices.
29
 Relying on ordinary usage 
in spite of this begs the question of whether such usage requires revision in light 
of certain social or historical facts. In the case of racism, my argument is that such 
revisions are in fact necessary. Historians, sociologists, and philosophers alike 
have demonstrated that contemporary (post-Civil Rights era) manifestations of 
race and racism differ significantly from pre-Civil-Rights-era racism.
30
 For one, 
racial discrimination has come to be prohibited de jure, and a corresponding near-
consensus has emerged that such forms of discrimination (as well as racist beliefs, 
attitudes and practices more generally) are deeply immoral. Likewise, explicit 
racial prejudice has, for the most part, become socially taboo, and so its public 
manifestations have become predictably less prevalent.
31
 If one relies on an 
“ordinary” conception that limits racism to the actions, attitudes, and beliefs of 
individuals, one would be tempted to conclude from these facts (as many have) 
that racism is no longer a serious problem, or at least not nearly as serious as it 
once was. However, the inequalities in wealth, health, education, employment, 
and virtually every other measure of well-being that accompanied the explicit 
prejudice of the pre-Civil-Rights era have not similarly diminished, as one might 
expect.
32
 The divergent courses of racial prejudice and racial inequality then, 
seem to suggest that the latter is not dependent upon the former. Thus an 
institutional or structural conception of racism like the one I have provided above 
is necessary in order to explain the persistence of racial inequality in the 
structures and institutions of civil society, separate from the beliefs, attitudes, and 
actions of individual persons. 
 
Still, one might wonder, why insist on describing the systematic racial 
inequality that continues to mark the post-Civil-Rights era as a form of racism? 
Why not reserve the term racism for phenomena involving intentional acts of 
discrimination and speak, on the other hand, of racial injustice, racial inequality, 
racial oppression, or even white supremacy? Lawrence Blum, for example, argues 
that there is an important difference between a company that uses word-of-mouth 
recruiting with the intention of excluding black applicants, and a company that 
has no such intention, but achieves the same outcome. “The commonality,” he 
suggests, “is best expressed by saying that both practices equally sustain racial 
injustice or have a deleterious impact on black job seekers, not by saying they are 
both examples of ‘institutional racism.’”
33
 His justification for reserving the term 
racism for cases of intentional harm (institutional or individual) is two-fold. On 
the one hand, he aims to resist an “all or nothing” approach to racism that 
overlooks the various nuances between different kinds of “racial ills.” By 
developing a vocabulary that reflects these differences, one can more easily 
recognize that not all of the actions, attitudes and beliefs frequently referred to as 
racist have the same moral value. That is, racial insensitivity may be bad, but not 
15 
 
as bad as racial hatred, as expressed in hate crimes, for example. Similarly, an 
institution that unintentionally furthered racial inequality may be bad, but one that 
does so intentionally is worse.  
 
I am sympathetic to Blum’s concern to reserve the term ‘racism’ for only 
the most serious racial ills. But this is precisely why I think the term should be 
used for (even unintentional) cases of institutional racism, since these, rather than 
intentional acts of prejudice, are the most far-reaching, normatively pressing 
varieties of racial ills present in society today. If the force of our considered 
judgments about individual racial prejudice could be applied to the trenchant 
racial inequalities still common in the United States today, perhaps we might 
make some long overdue progress in addressing those inequalities, in the interest 
of justice. 
 
I also recognize the importance of distinguishing shades of moral 
responsibility in relation to “racial ills,” as I mentioned above. For example, I 
think those who merely benefit from institutional racism are less morally culpable 
than those who actively promote it, and I think those who unknowingly benefit 
from it are less morally culpable than those who knowingly do so. Indeed, one of 
the reasons for providing a more detailed account of the relation between 
seemingly independent systemic imperatives and the conscious, collective actions 
of individuals is to capture the complex ways in which individuals can exert 
conscious, collective control over complex systems, thus bringing them back 
under the purview of morality (in addition to justice). Admittedly, I have not 
focused extensively on the moral implications of my thesis, but I do think that 
recognizing the existence and scope of contemporary institutional racism does 
have such implications, for example, in regard to the question of whether one has 
a moral duty to oppose unjust systems, or to refuse (where possible) undeserved 
advantages. 
 
But Blum presents a more pragmatic justification for his restricted usage 
as well. He worries that the “conceptual inflation” of the term racism has 
weakened its denunciative force; that since the term racism has come to be so 
widely and diversely used, those that are accused of it may simply shrug it off, or 
claim that their accusers are overly sensitive.
34
 In relation to institutional racism, 
the worry seems to be that labeling certain institutions racist risks branding those 
individuals involved with it as racists, and that such a label immediately puts such 
individuals on the defensive, intent on denying the validity of the individual 
charge by disputing the institutional one (or vice versa). 
 
It does seem that expanding the term ‘racism’ to encompass structural 
disadvantage risks alienating some whites, who understand the claim to entail that 
their position of relative advantage makes them “racists,” as anyone who has 
attempted to address issues of institutional racism in the classroom knows. White 
students frequently, and somewhat justifiably object to any (perceived) inference 
about their individual moral character based on structural features of their society 
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that are (perceived to be) outside of their control. But this resistance is based on a 
misunderstanding. While individual and institutional racism frequently overlap 
(for example, when the latter is motivated by the racial malice of individuals), the 
two are conceptually separable, as I have aimed to demonstrate in this essay. So, 
condemning an institution as racist does not directly imply anything about the 
moral standing of the individuals associated with it. When whites (or any other 
relatively advantaged group) fully understand this, they can abandon the typical 
reflexive, defensive posture, and approach institutional racism as participants in a 
collective project in the interest of social justice.                
 
On the other hand, some resistance to recognizing institutional racism 
goes deeper than just labels. There may be good (prudential) reasons for whites to 
resist having the advantages they enjoy characterized as the unjust effects of 
institutional racism. Consciously or unconsciously, white resistance to claims of 
institutional racism may be an attempt to secure and protect those resources that 
have been accumulated over centuries of white supremacy. Charles Tilly calls this 
“opportunity hoarding,” and argues that it typically characterizes the most 
trenchant forms of social inequality, including racial inequality in the United 
States.
35
 As I argued above, for whites to acknowledge that racial minorities are 
structurally disadvantaged by institutional racism implies that their own 
accomplishments are, at least in part, the product of structural advantages and are, 
therefore, not entirely deserved. This kind of acknowledgement is made difficult 
not only by our psychological makeup,
36
 but also by practical imperatives to 
protect the resources and opportunities of oneself and one’s social group. These 
are serious obstacles to eliminating institutional racism, deserving of more 
consideration than I can give them here. My only point at present is that these 
difficulties are not a result of using the language of racism to characterize the 
advantage. The obstacle remains whether one describes such a state of affairs as 
involving “racial injustice,” “racial disadvantage,” “racial inequality,” or 
whatever other term one prefers.      
   
  So, while it is important to pay attention to the various degrees of moral 
responsibility associated with institutional racism, and while it pays to think 
carefully about how one makes the case for institutional racism in the classroom, 
or in other settings, neither the principled nor the strategic objections to 
characterizing structural racial disadvantage as racist ultimately succeed. Neither 
do the concerns about departing from “ordinary usage” outweigh the value of 




 I have argued here that Glasgow’s “disrespect analysis” of racism fails to capture 
the essence of institutional racism, which is not a matter of respect, but of justice. 
In making this case, I have tried to specify the relationship between individual and 
institutional agency, something Glasgow’s analysis seems to me to require, but 
fails to provide. While this effort does not ultimately vindicate Glasgow’s account 
of institutional racism, it is a valuable task in its own right, insofar as it helps to 
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illuminate the relationship between the individual beliefs, attitudes, and actions 
that are most commonly described as racist, and the institutional arrangements 
that structure opportunities and resources in ways that produce serious, systemic 
racial injustice, and that may or may not be animated by individual racism. 
Contract theory can be helpful to this end, as it illustrates the ways in which social 
institutions can arise out of the conscious, collective will of individual agents. 
However, contract theory fails to capture the other side of the equation: the ways 
in which institutions, once established, can in turn exert pressure on individuals to 
conform to institutional demands that appear to have a certain kind of autonomy. 
This dimension of institutional agency is crucial for understanding how 
institutional racism can continue virtually unabated even as individual racism 
becomes less prevalent. When one understands the unburdening function of social 
systems, the fact that extreme racial injustice can coexist with a superficial racial 
tolerance is not at all puzzling. It is precisely because of the increasing complexity 
and efficiency of social systems that intentionally racist enforcement of white 
supremacy is no longer necessary. Systematic poverty, for example, combined 
with a massive prison-industrial complex is far more effective at disenfranchising 
black voters than the Ku Klux Klan could have ever been. And the corresponding 
advantage to whites can be enjoyed without the pangs of conscience that might be 
the result of active racial hostility. In order to capture the way in which 
institutions can sustain racial advantage semi-autonomously, I have introduced 
Habermas’ system/lifeworld framework, with the important qualification that the 
benefits (unburdening functions) and harms (colonizing functions) of systems are 
not evenly distributed across a generalized lifeworld, but depend significantly on 
how one is positioned racially in society. This unequal and unjust distribution of 
systemic benefits and burdens, rather than disrespect, is the key to understanding 
institutional racism.   
  
  Finally, let me remind the reader that my injustice-based account of 
institutional racism is not meant to supplant Glasgow’s view across the board. 
That is, I am not claiming that all forms of racism must be understood in terms of 
justice, only that institutional racism must. I suppose this makes my view 
pluralist, as opposed to Glasgow’s monist view. But unlike, say, ontological 
pluralism, a pluralist view of racism does not entail that individual and 
institutional racism are distinct entities without overlap. Indeed, one of the 
advantages of the system/lifeworld framework is its ability to illuminate the ways 
in which the two are related; that is, the ways in which individual racism can 
become institutionalized, and the ways in which institutional racism can produce 
individual racism. Yet this is different from seeking to reduce the two phenomena 
to one, based on some unifying feature like disrespect, or injustice. Given that 
philosophers since time immemorial have been driven to discover the most basic 
components of the world (both natural and social), I can certainly understand the 
desire for a unified account. I do not think, however, that a pluralist (or “dual 
perspective,” as I prefer to call it) view should be particularly troubling for social 
theorists. Simplicity may be a theoretical virtue, but from a sociological 
perspective, one should not be surprised if a particular social phenomenon admits 
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of different levels of explanation, according to different models. It may be that in 
some cases, such theoretical pluralism provides a richer account of the 
phenomenon than any one theoretical framework alone. Such seems to be the case 
with racism, notwithstanding Glasgow’s attempt to account for its many forms 
under a single analysis.
37
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